
Daily Report 19/2022

27 January 2022¹

Summary

- In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 510 ceasefire violations, including 20 explosions. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 403 ceasefire violations in the region.
- In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded six ceasefire violations. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 57 ceasefire violations in the region.
- The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote, and Petrivske.
- The Mission monitored the operation and repair of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The SMM continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at three entry-exit checkpoints and two corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Luhansk region.
- The Mission visited two border crossing points outside government control in Luhansk region.
- The SMM's freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including at three checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk region and at a border crossing point outside government control in Luhansk region. Its unmanned aerial vehicles again encountered instances of GPS signal interference assessed as caused by probable jamming.*




¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 26 January 2022. All times are in Eastern European Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, weather conditions limited the observational capabilities of some SMM cameras.

³ Including explosions.

⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.

Map of recorded ceasefire violations



In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 510 ceasefire violations, including 20 undetermined explosions. The majority of ceasefire violations occurred in areas close to the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) (see below) and in areas south and south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 77km south of Donetsk). Of the former, the Mission assessed 96 ceasefire violations which occurred in an area south-south-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) as a live-fire exercise in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training in the security zone. In the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded 403 ceasefire violations in the region.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded six ceasefire violations. All ceasefire violations occurred in an area south-west of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below). In the <u>previous reporting period</u>, the Mission recorded 57 ceasefire violations in the region, some of which also occurred close to the aforementioned disengagement area.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the TCG on 22 July 2020 regarding Measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July 2020 until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has recorded at least 104,126 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 28,435 explosions, 24,879 projectiles in flight, 448 muzzle flashes, 476 illumination flares and at least 49,888 bursts and shots).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

The Mission monitored government-controlled areas inside and near the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and observed a calm situation.

In Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), inside the **disengagement** area near Zolote, the Mission <u>again</u> observed a military jeep with two people inside wearing Ukrainian Armed Forces uniforms, not visibly armed. Later, it observed the jeep travelling west, accompanied by a civilian vehicle with three people, also not visibly armed and wearing Ukrainian Armed Forces winter camouflage uniforms.

During the reporting period, an SMM patrol heard six shots of small-arms fire, assessed as outside the area, but within 5km of its periphery. (For details, see the table below.)

Near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission saw three members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them). The SMM again saw the seven previously observed containers located south of the area's southern edge and inside the disengagement area. It also observed that the previously reported road barriers across road T-1316, on the area's southern edge, continued to be closed.

On the northern edge of the area, the Mission also observed an anti-tank mine (TM-62) (not previously reported) placed on the roof of a structure, assessed as part of a former checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

While positioned at three locations near the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Weapons storage sites

At one permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region 26 January

The SMM noted that all weapons observed at this site were present, compared with the previous visit on 17 December 2021.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn⁶

At one heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region 26 January

The SMM noted that all weapons observed at this site were present, compared with the previous visit on 17 December 2021.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, the SMM saw two howitzers in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region. (For further information, see the table below.)

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone

The Mission saw nine armoured combat vehicles in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including in three residential areas, as well as an infantry fighting vehicle in a residential area in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region. (For further information, see the table below.)

Mine hazard signs near the Donetsk Filtration Station, Donetsk region

On the eastern edge of road H-20, leading from the DFS to Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM observed four improvised mine hazard signs (red plastic bottles placed on sticks, not previously reported), two of which were located about 300m northwest, and two about 1km north-north-west of the station.

SMM facilitation of the operation and repair of critical civilian infrastructure

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS. While positioned at four locations near the station, the SMM heard 240 bursts and shots of small-arms fire on the morning of 26 January, assessed as within a 5km radius of the DFS. Of these, 96 were assessed as a live-fire exercise inside the security zone (see above).

⁶ The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

The SMM also monitored repair works to power lines near Verkhnotoretske (government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk), and to water pipelines in Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 97km south of Donetsk). While facilitating works near Verkhnotoretske, the Mission heard ten bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed distance of 4km south.

Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints

In Luhansk region, the Mission observed that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Stanytsia Luhanska was open, with people queueing to travel towards government-controlled areas.

The SMM noted that the EECPs near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were open, but that the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia were closed.

Areas near the border outside government control⁷

While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the Mission observed one car (with "LPR" plates), one bus (with "LPR" plates), and ten people (six women and four men, mixed ages) entering Ukraine. At the same time, the SMM observed no vehicular or pedestrians traffic exiting Ukraine. After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 40 minutes, the Mission observed nine people (four women and four men, mixed ages, and a child) entering Ukraine. At the same time, the SMM observed five people (three women and two men, mixed ages) exiting Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Kherson, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

⁷ According to decisions in 2014 by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, operations are officially designated as suspended at these and other border crossing points located outside government control.

_

*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Minsk agreements have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the government (for example, see below). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Denials:

- At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 102km south-east of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations denied the Mission passage south and east, thus preventing the SMM from visiting the border crossing point near Novoazovsk. While at the checkpoint, the SMM observed civilian traffic passing through.
- At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the Mission to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Delays:

- At a checkpoint in Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), a visibly armed member of the armed formations allowed the Mission passage further west into the settlement only after about 35 minutes, citing "a need to wait for approval from superiors". While at the checkpoint, the SMM observed civilian traffic passing through.
- At a checkpoint in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), two members of the armed formations, one visibly armed, allowed the SMM passage further east only after about 35 minutes, citing "a need to wait for approval from superiors".

Other impediments:8

- SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, during eight flights: four times while flying over areas near Kalynove (non-government controlled, 60 km west of Luhansk), three times over areas in and near Bolotene (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk), and once over areas near Irmino (non-government controlled, 54km west of Luhansk).

⁸ For cases of probable jamming and jamming mentioned in this section, the interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of tens of kilometres from the UAVs' positions.

Tables of weapons

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation					
Non-government-controlled areas									
26/1/2022	2	Towed howitzer (D-30A Lyagushka, 122mm)	Near Starobesheve (32km south-east of Donetsk)	Patrol					

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone9

Date	No.	Туре	Location	Source of observation					
Government-controlled areas									
25/1/2022	1	Combat engineering vehicle (BAT-2)	Near Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk)						
	1	Armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined) In a residential area of Chernenko (86km south of Donetsk)		Mini-UAV					
	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)	Near Vermeles (Allem north west of Lubanele)						
	1	Armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined)	Near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk)						
26/1/2022	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70)	Near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk)						
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB M, with an anti-aircraft gun ZU-23, 23mm)	In a residential area of Novoselivka Druha (69km south	Patrol					
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB)	of Donetsk)						
	1	Armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2)	In a residential area of Malynove (19km north-east of Luhansk)						
	1	Armoured recovery vehicle (type undetermined)	Near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk)						
Non-government-controlled areas									
26/1/2022	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1) In a residential area of Brianka (46km south-west of Luhansk)		Patrol					

-

 $^{^{9}}$ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 26 January 2022¹⁰

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera at Donetsk Filtration Station (15km N of Donetsk)	300-500m S	Recorded	2	Projectile	SSE to NNW	N/K	25-Jan, 21:43
SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (non- government-controlled, 9km NW of Donetsk city centre)	1-3km W	Recorded	1	Illumination flare	S to N	N/K	25-Jan, 23:54
SMM camera 1km SW of Shyrokyne	4-6km NNE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	25-Jan, 20:07
(government-controlled, 100km S of	4-6km N	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	25-Jan, 20:51
Donetsk)	4-6km NNE	Recorded	4	Projectile	W to E	N/K	25-Jan, 21:34
	4-6km N	Recorded	1	Projectile	W to E	N/K	25-Jan, 22:35
	4-6km N	Recorded	1	Projectile	W to E	N/K	25-Jan, 23:22
	4-6km N	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	25-Jan, 23:41
	4-6km N	Recorded	1	Projectile	E to W	N/K	25-Jan, 23:48
	4-6km N	Recorded	15	Projectile	SW to NE	N/K	26-Jan, 18:16
	4-6km N	Recorded	15	Projectile	SW to NE	N/K	26-Jan, 18:17
	4-6km N	Recorded	20	Projectile	SW to NE	N/K	26-Jan, 18:45
	4-6km N	Recorded	1	Projectile	SW to NE	N/K	26-Jan, 18:46
Railway station in Yasynuvata (non- government-controlled, 16km NE of Donetsk)	2-3km NE	Heard	2	Burst		Small arms	26-Jan, 10:00
About 500m WSW of Yasynuvata Railway	2-3km S	Heard	3	Burst		Small arms	26-Jan, 10:30
station (non-government-controlled, 16km	2-3km SSE	Heard	90	Shot		Small arms	26-Jan, 10:40-10:45
NE of Donetsk)	2-3km SSE	Heard	6	Shot		Small arms	26-Jan, 10:35
About 2km SSE of Kamianka	0.5-1km ESE	Heard	13	Burst		Small arms	26-Jan, 09:54-09:56
(government-controlled, 20km N of Donetsk)	0.5-1km ESE	Heard	23	Shot		Small arms	26-Jan, 09:54-09:56
About 500m NE of Kamianka	1-2km E	Heard	37	Burst		Small arms	26-Jan, 11:17-11:22
(government-controlled, 20km N of	1-2km E	Heard	23	Shot		Small arms	26-Jan, 11:17-11:22
Donetsk)	2-3km ESE	Heard	43	Burst		Small arms	26-Jan, 11:30-11:34
About 1km NW of Verkhnotoretske (government-controlled, 23km NE of Donetsk)	4km S	Heard	10	Burst		HMG	26-Jan, 10:29-10:30
Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, non-government-controlled, 23km NE of Donetsk)	3-5km SSE	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	26-Jan, 11:17
About 3km SW of Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km S of Donetsk)	2-3km SW	Heard	6	Burst		HMG	26-Jan, 11:32
About 3km SW of Chermalyk	4-6km SE	Heard	84	Burst		Small arms	26-Jan, 11:41-11:44
(government-controlled, 77km S of	4-6km SE	Heard	45	Shot		Small arms	26-Jan, 11:41-11:44
Donetsk	8-10km S	Heard	15	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	26-Jan, 11:41-11:44
	4-6km SE	Heard	44	Shot		Small arms	26-Jan, 11:44-11:58
2km SW of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk)	500m NW	Heard	6	Shot	Assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote	Small arms	26-Jan, 13:35-13:40

_

¹⁰ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an "N/K"), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹¹



11 The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).
